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ABSTRACT
This paper extends the microstructure literature, by examining the previously
undocumented intraday trading patterns in trading volume, price volatility, order depth
and relative spreads for both the warrant and option market in Australia. Comparisons of
intraday variations across these derivative securities allows for insight to be drawn into
competing market microstructure theories and provides the opportunity to examine
whether market design differences explain variations in observed intraday patterns. We
find that intraday trading patterns documented in the warrant and option markets can be
explained by their market designs, along with theories relating to time-varying information
asymmetry and time-varying hedging trades around nontrading periods.
JEL classification: G10; G14; G15
Keywords: Warrants market; Options market; Australian Stock Exchange; Intraday trading behaviour
†

Corresponding author. Mail: Room 447, H69 – Economics and Business Building, University of Sydney, N.S.W
2006, Australia. E-mail: R.Segara@econ.usyd.edu.au
* The authors are grateful to the Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA) for the supply of the
SEATS data. We are responsible for any remaining errors.

1. INTRODUCTION
A large body of empirical research has rapidly grown, which documents the existence of
systematic regularities found in trading volume, volatility and bid-ask spreads across the trading
day. The existence of U-shaped intraday trading volume and volatility patterns, characterized by
high values at the open and close, as compared to periods within the day have been reported
consistently across a number of stock markets.1 Interestingly, intraday bid ask spread behaviour
has not yielded similar patterns across all these markets. In the wake of this evidence, several
competing theories have arisen to explain intraday trading behaviour across different market
settings.2 In this paper, additional evidence is brought to bear on these theoretical models by
documenting intraday trading volume, volatility, order depth and spread patterns in the equity
1

2

Much of the earlier work examining intraday trading patterns on stock markets has been predominately performed in the United States. For
a more detail review of the extant microstructure literature, refer to Coughenour and Shastri (1999).
These theories fall into four broad categories: inventory holding costs; market power; information asymmetry; and the learn by trading
model and are discussed in Section 4.
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warrants and equity options market. The paper contributes to the existing microstructure
literature, where it represents the first documented examination of intraday trading patterns in the
equity warrants and equity options market in Australia.
The examination of equity warrants and equity options provides the paper with the
opportunity to examine whether market design (institutional) differences explain variations in
observed intraday patterns. As an example of these market design differences, the equity warrants
market operates under an electronic order-driven system, where any one person can establish a
bid-ask spread. The equity warrants market can be characterized by a hybrid market, where both
limit-order traders and a single market maker (i.e., the warrant issuer), jointly establish prices. By
contrast, the equity options market operates under an electronically driven competitive market
maker system, where any designated member can establish a market in the option.3 Unlike the
warrant market, trading on the options market closes for a short lunch break and continues after
the underlying market has closed. These trading hour differences also provide an opportunity to
test the intraday trading behaviour in one related market, when another is closed.
The documentation of intraday trading patterns for equity warrants and equity options
examined can provide market operators and/or regulators with better market intelligence with
which to fine-tune the market surveillance discipline. Market surveillance is concerned with the
identification of abnormal and possible illegal market behaviour such as insider trading or market
manipulation for the purpose of maintaining market integrity. A key component of the task of
identifying “abnormal” trading behaviour is the ability to identify “normal” trading behaviour.
Documenting intraday patterns of metrics representing liquidity and volatility over long periods
and observing how these patterns change as a result of institutional and other differences can
assist regulators to minimise false positive alerts. From an academic perspective, variations in
intraday trading patterns between these two related markets can have implications for modelling
the lead/lag relations existing between these two markets, which in turn can help to better
understand the contribution of each instrument to price discovery and the overall efficiency of the
market.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional details of the
warrant and option markets. Section 3 provides a review of empirical work examining the
intraday trading behaviour of options reported in other overseas exchanges. This is followed in
Section 4 by an overview of relevant theoretical models constructed to explain observed intraday
trading behaviour across distinct market settings. Section 5 outlines the data and method and
Section 6 reports our results. Section 7 summarizes and concludes the paper.
2. INSTITUTIONAL DETAIL
2.1. THE EQUITY WARRANT MARKET
The equity warrant market in Australia commenced in 1991, fifteen years after the introduction of
the first exchange traded option (ETO). Equity warrants are underwritten by third parties (usually
investment banks), other than the underlying company.4 A call (put) equity warrant gives the
3

4

Market makers supply liquidity to the market by quoting bid prices, ask prices and number of shares at which they are willing to trade.
Unlike a specialist system, no one designated member holds the ‘order book,’ which contains market information unavailable to others.
Traditionally, warrants are issued (i.e., written) by a company that permits the holder to convert the warrant into the shares of the company,
upon exercising the warrant contract. If the warrant is exercised, additional shares are required to be issued by the company. This
corresponds to a dilution in the ownership of existing investors in the company and consequently changes the company’s capital structure.
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holder the right, but not the obligation to buy (sell) the underlying stock at a predetermined price
on or before the expiry date. For this right, the warrant buyer pays the warrant issuer a premium,
which represents the market price of the warrant. While there exists similarities between warrants
and ETOs, several distinctions remain, namely; (i) warrants are not allowed to be short sold; (ii)
no margin payments are required by issuer’s to cover their obligations under the warrant; (iii)
investors can purchase non-standard contract sizes; (iv) warrants are traded on a continuous basis
without a lunchtime break; and (v) higher premiums are usually needed to enter the warrants
market.
Warrants are traded on the Stock Exchange Automated Trading System (SEATS) in
the same manner as shares and have typical expiry terms ranging from three to eighteen months,
with the length likely to be twelve months.5 Normal trading in SEATS takes place on a
continuous basis from 10:00 to 16:00 on Monday to Friday. Prior to the commencement of
trading a call market operates on the ASX, where investors through their brokers are invited
(called) to submit orders to SEATS. During the call market, orders are queued according to price
time priority, where no trading occurs until the end of the call. The call market takes place from
7.00 to 10:00. A unique set of market opening procedures is used on SEATS to commence
normal trading each morning. Opening takes place at 10:00 and lasts for about 10 minutes.
During this phase, SEATS determines whether bids are higher than or equal to asks or vice versa.
If there are bids higher than the lowest ask, an algorithm is employed to determine the opening
price. From 10:00 to 10:09, opening times are staggered, depending on the starting letter of the
ASX stock code. SEATS currently opens randomly for five different groups of stocks (in
alphabetical order). Once stocks are opened, they trade continuously until 16:00 when they all
close together. In order for third parties (hereafter termed issuers) to be granted trading status
from the ASX, they are required to facilitate a market in the warrants issued, but are not obligated
to do so. Hence, the equity warrants market can be seen as a hybrid market, in which both limitorder traders and an unofficial designated dealer (i.e., the warrant issuer) establish prices.
2.2 THE EQUITY OPTION MARKET
The equity option market in Australia commenced in 1976 and is managed by the Australian
Stock Exchange Options (ASXO) division. Typically, option contracts that trade are American
style and standardized by contract size (each contract representing 1,000 shares of the underlying
stock), expiry date, and exercise price. The standardization of options permits easier transfer of
rights and obligations of the contract. Expiration is usually nine months, though the ASXO
occasionally lists spot monthly options and longer term options.
The options market operates using the Derivatives Trading Facility (DTF), which is a
customised version of the CLICK system developed by the Swedish Options and Futures
Exchange (SOFFEX).6 The DTF is a fully automated screen based system, which allows brokers
to view and access the options market immediately. Normal trading in the options market occurs
during two daily trading sessions: a morning session from 10:00 to 12:30 and an afternoon

5
6

In this paper, equity warrants considered are not issued by the company upon whose shares they are written, but instead are written by a
third party. If a holder of ASX warrants decides to exercise his or her contract, no additional shares are issued from the company.
SEATS is a competitive and transparent electronic order book
CLICK is a fully electronic market, primarily for the trading of options and other derivative products. The CLICK Exchange System was
developed by OM Technology (OMT), a subsidiary of the OM Group. The OM Group owns and operates the Swedish futures and options
exchange, OM Stockholm.
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session from 14:00 to 16.15. The DTF consists of the Central Orderbook and the Bulletin Board.
Market makers transact in all series of all classes of options through the Central Orderbook for
their clients. The Bulletin Board enables market makers to advertise their interest in trading and
transacting particular option strategies. Market makers are required to provide orders in the atand near-the-money series at a maximum spread for a minimum number of contracts.7 Where a
market does not exist, market makers are obliged to provide two-way quotes in other series upon
requests. An absence in liquidity in some option series may exist, dependent upon the level of
activity in the underlying stocks and whether those option classes carry market making
obligations. Unlike SEATS, the DTF does not allow orders to be inputted prior to the opening
and does not carry forward unexecuted orders to the next trading day. Though the options market
opens at 10:00, each option class remains suspended until the underlying stock is opened in
SEATS. All orders on the DTF are transparent to market makers and are executed automatically
on a price time priority basis.
3. REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES
Empirical studies examining the intraday patterns on equity option markets is relatively scarce,
largely due to the absence of data in these markets. Intraday trading behaviour in equity warrants
has received no attention, a situation that this paper amends. This section reviews empirical
studies, which document the intraday trading behaviour of trading volume, price volatility and
bid-ask spreads in the equity options market.
3.1 TRADING VOLUME
Unlike the U-shaped patterns in trading volume documented across various overseas stock
markets, Stephan and Whaley (1990) report a distinctly different intraday pattern for call options
traded on the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE). They report that trading volume is
lowest at the open and rises to its highest level by approximately 45 minutes into the trading day.
A decline in trading volume is then observed, but less pronounced than that documented for the
underlying market. An increase in option trading volume before the close of the underlying
market is then observed. This is followed by a sharp fall during the close of options trading.
Easley, O’Hara and Srinivas (1998) also find a trading peak 45 minutes from market open for
both call and put options traded on the CBOE. Despite these findings, trading volume peaks after
market open have been documented to occur earlier in the trading day. Mayhew, Sarin and Shastri
(1995) show that trading frequency peaks after the first 30 minutes of trading, whilst Chan,
Chung and Johnson (1995a) report that trading volume peaks as early as 5 minutes after the
market opens on the CBOE. The later peaks in trading volume in the options market are attributed
to a number of differences. First, unlike underlying stock market of the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE), the CBOE does not use a sequential call opening procedure. Second, the
competitive dealer structure of the CBOE necessitates traders to wait for the best dealer’s quotes
to arrive, unlike the NYSE where traders are provided with only one best quote from the
specialist.
Empirical studies have examined the trading behaviour when option market trading
hours continue after the close of the underlying market. Aggarwal and Gruca (1993) find that the
rate of option trading on the CBOE rapidly increases in the 10 minutes following the end of
7

Market makers usually provide orders in the six option series, which have exercise prices closest to the current share price.
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trading in the underlying market, but then decreases in the last 5 minutes. Chan et al. (1995a) also
report that trading volume of call (put) options tends to decrease (increase) in the last 10 minutes
of CBOE trading when the underlying market is closed. A plausible explanation for this result is
that risk averse investors holding long positions in the underlying market will hedge their
overnight exposure by buying put options.
The observed intraday patterns in trading volume on the CBOE are not only unique to
this exchange. Berkman (1992) confirms a similar pattern for equity call options traded on the
European Options Exchange (EOE), where option trading volume is low during the first 30
minutes. Thereafter, it peaks for the next two hours of trading and then falls off before increasing
to a higher level for the last two hours of trading, though less pronounced than during the first
two hours of trading. Niemeyer (1994) reports a comparable hump-shaped intraday pattern, where
options traded on the Stockholm Options and Forwards Exchange (OM) take approximately 20 to
30 minutes to reach a peak following the market open.
3.2 PRICE VOLATILITY
Sheikh and Ronn (1994) document intraday variations in volatility for CBOE options across the
trading day. They find that the variance of call and puts returns exhibit a familiar U-shaped
pattern found in the underlying market across the trading day. Similarly, Chan, et al. (1995a)
show that standardized mid-quote return volatility follows a U-shaped pattern, where returns for
CBOE options are more volatile at the open relative to the close of trading in the underlying
market. A decline in volatility during the last 10 minutes of CBOE trading (i.e. when the
underlying market is closed) is then observed. This result is theoretically consistent with the
explanation that the absence of a price for the underlying security will lead to a decline in
options’ trading.
3.3 BID-ASK SPREADS
Chan, et al. (1995a) compare the influence of differing market structures of the CBOE and the
NYSE on the intraday behaviour of spreads. Unlike the U-shaped patterns found on the NYSE,
they observe an L-shaped pattern for CBOE options, where spreads are wide at the opening
period of the trading day and narrow near the close. Aggarwal and Gruca (1993) also find
significant declines in bid-ask spreads towards the end of the trading day on the CBOE. Gwilym,
Clare and Thomas (1998) confirm these L-shaped patterns in spreads for stock index options
traded on the London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange (LIFFE), an open
outcry market with competing market makers. By contrast, Berkman (1992) finds that the bid-ask
spreads on the EOE during the trading day are high at the open, decline as trading progresses and
then widen in the last two hours of trading. Berkman suggests that the opening of the NYSE
increases price uncertainty in options traded on the EOE during the one-hour interval before the
close.

46

The Australasian Accounting Business & Finance Journal, May, 2007
Segara and Segara: Intraday Trading Patterns. Vol. 1, No.2.

4. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Several theoretical models have been developed, which seek to provide an explanation for
intraday trading patterns documented in the empirical literature across various overseas
exchanges. The majority of these models analyse the process of price discovery through order
arrival and quote revision under two distinct forms of market organization; a competitive market
dealer system and a monopolistic specialist system. The examination of price formation in these
models has principal implications for explaining intraday bid-ask spread behaviour. We note that
predictions from these models are also applicable to explain intraday trading volume and
volatility patterns across the trading day because of their close relations with spread. These
models are classified into four broad categories: inventory holding costs; market power;
information asymmetry; and the learn by trading model.
4.1 INVENTORY HOLDING COST MODEL
The inventory holding cost models of the bid-ask spread focus on the costs faced by risk-averse
dealers who are forced to carry long or short positions in an asset that deviates from their
preferred (optimum) holdings.8 This deviation is caused by temporal discrepancies between
market buy and sell orders and the obligation to provide liquidity in the asset. The model implies
that dealers will set bid-ask spreads as part of compensation for sub-optimal inventory positions
(see Amihud and Mendelson, 1980), suggesting that spreads will increase with price and the risk
of the security, and decrease with trading volume and the number of market makers.
Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1993) show that in a specialist dealer market, these models
imply positive relations between trading activity and bid-ask spreads as a specialist may be forced
to accumulate an unwanted inventory position during periods of intense trading activity. Hence,
bid ask spreads may widen at the open and close of trading reflecting the elevation in trading
activity. By contrast, since competing market makers can avoid accumulating excessive short or
long positions during periods of high trading activity, spreads may narrow. An empirical
investigation conducted by Chan et al. (1995a) and Chan, Christie and Schultz (1995b) supports
the inventory model by documenting a narrowing in spreads before market closure on the CBOE
and Nasdaq and widening of spreads on the NYSE.9 Consequently, it is anticipated that equity
warrant and equity option spreads should narrow immediately preceding a non-trading period.
4.2 MARKET POWER MODEL
Brock and Kleidon (1992) develop a model of a specialist market maker with monopolistic
power. They show, that a monopolistic market maker will extract rents from traders by widening
spreads during periods of high inelastic transaction demand. Their model recognises that shifts in
optimal portfolio holdings of market agents are likely to occur before and after a trading break
(e.g. overnight), leading to a greater probability of increased inelastic transaction demand.
Subsequently, they suggest that spreads, volume and volatility in a specialist dealer market will be
elevated in the intervals following non-trading periods. This is consistent with intraday patterns
documented for NYSE (a specialist dealer market). It is recognised that on competitive
exchanges, where dealers do not have market power, a similar pattern cannot be predicted.
8

9

Inventory holding cost models of the bid-ask spread can be traced back to Stoll (1978) for specialist dealer markets, and Ho and Stoll (1980;
1983) for competitive dealer markets.
Kleidon and Werner (1996) also show that bid-ask spreads narrow near the close of trading on the competitive dealer market of the London
Stock Exchange (LSE).
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Empirical tests of the market power model revolve around comparisons of spreads
immediately around the overnight trading break on the NYSE and other competitive dealer
markets including the CBOE (Chan et al., 1995a) and NASDAQ (Chan et al., 1995b). These
papers show that spreads appear to widen before trading breaks on the NYSE, but not in
competitive dealer markets. Extending these results to the warrants market with a monopolistic
dealer, the market power model suggests that the intraday pattern of spreads will be high at both
the open and close of trading. By contrast, spreads are not expected to widen immediately
preceding and following a trading break in a market with competitive dealers such as that found
on the ASXO.
4.3 INFORMATION ASYMMETRY MODEL
Information asymmetry models examine the averse information costs faced by dealers who trade
with different types of participants (see Copeland and Galai, 1983, Glosten and Milgrom, 1985,
and Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988). The model assumes that dealers are confronted with both
liquidity motivated traders and ones that carry superior information. The model predicts that the
dealer will set the spread wide enough to ensure that the expected gains from trading with
liquidity traders exceed or match the expected losses from trading with informed traders during
periods of high information asymmetry.
Empirical papers, which contribute towards the information asymmetry model
suggests that bid-ask spreads are expected to be wide at the opening of trading and gradually
decline throughout the trading day. French and Roll (1986) suggest that the flow of public
information will arrive more frequently during trading hours, where private information is
gradually impounded into asset prices during the trading day. This is consistent with Madhavan’s
(1992) information model, which suggests that information asymmetry is gradually resolved
during the trading day. Subsequently, this leads to reductions in the bid-ask spread across the
trading day. Foster and Viswanathan (1994) develop an asymmetric information model with two
informed traders that predicts high volume, volatility and bid-ask spreads at the start of the
trading day. More recently, Hong and Wang (2000), model a continuous-time stock market with
periodic market closures in which investors optimally trade for both allocation and information
reasons.10 Their model predicts that time-varying hedging demand dominates the market open
and the effect of time-varying information asymmetry dominates the market close. In line with
this result, it is anticipated that there will be wider bid ask spreads are both the open and close of
trading in both the equity warrants and equity options market.
4.4 LEARN BY TRADING MODEL
There is a growing body of literature with models of ‘learn-by-trading’ (e.g. Grundy and McNicols
(1989), Dow and Gorton (1993), Leach and Madhavan (1993) and Romer (1993)). In these models,
equilibrium prices are ‘discovered’ through the trading process, where uninformed traders infer the
information held by informed traders by trading with (or against) them. Consequently, following a
period of trade suspension, uninformed traders will experiment with a series of ‘trial’ prices,
learning the true equilibrium price through the responses of informed traders. Leach and Madhavan
(1993) show that market makers will widen spreads to reduce the relative number of noise traders to
10

These trades are referred to as hedging trades and speculative trades. Hedging trades are those where investors adjust their asset portfolio by
trading the stock in order to hedge the risk of illiquid assets. Trades motivated by private information are referred to as speculative trades.
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obtain a cleaner information signal from trade prices and order flow. Overall, ‘learn-by-trading’
models predict that the loss in price discovery associated with trade suspensions will result in wider
spreads when trading resumes. Extending this model to the equity warrant and equity option market,
it is anticipated that there will be wider bid-ask spreads following a non-trading period, as a result of
heightened price experimentation.
5. DATA AND RESEARCH METHOD
Data for individual trades for warrant and option contracts are obtained from two separate
databases, which are acquired from the Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific
(SIRCA). The first is the high frequency SEATS database, which provides full details of all
equity warrant orders and trades placed on the ASX. These records provide details of security
code, price, volume, date, broker and time to the nearest hundredth of a second for every order
and trade. The second, the DTF database, provides a complete time-stamped history of quotes and
traded prices for all equity option series traded on the ASXO. Additionally, the ASX Signal E
database is used to identify the listing dates, expiration dates, exercise price and security type for
all warrant and option series traded. We collect this data from 1 January 2000 to 30 June 2000
(i.e., 123 trading days).
In our analysis, only warrant and option contracts that have identical underlying
stocks to one another are examined. To avoid problems associated with non-trading in derivative
assets, we employ a matching algorithm to identify the most actively traded options and warrants
covering a particular stock. Each day, the most active traded call (put) warrant series is matched
against its most active traded call (put) option series covering the same stock. Warrant and option
contracts trading within five days or less to maturity are excluded from the matching algorithm to
avoid any expiration effects. For each underlying stock, there can be at most 123 matched option
and warrant days (i.e., a day for which a matching sample of warrant and option data is available).
Those stocks with fewer than 20 option and warrant days are excluded from our sample. Our final
sample consists of 215 (21) equity call (put) warrant series and 998 (222) equity call (put) option
series over 32 (7) underlying stocks. All intraday analysis is partitioned into fifteen-minute
observation intervals. Fifteen-minute intervals are chosen to obtain estimates of variables
analysed.
5.1 VARIABLES USED IN THE ANALYSIS
The variables of interest in this paper include trading volume, price volatility, order depth and
relative bid-ask spreads. Warrant and option trading volume are represented by the number of
warrant contracts and option contracts traded for the chosen interval, respectively. Price volatility
is calculated as the time-weighted standard deviation of prices using bid-ask midpoints. The use
of quote midpoints avoids bid-ask bounce, which imparts an upward bias in price volatility
estimates based on trade prices (see Venkatesh, 1992). Order depth is measured by summing the
total volume of all orders on each side of the bid-ask schedule at the end of each interval.
Following McInish and Wood (1992), a time-weighted relative bid-ask spread measure is
calculated. For each quotation during an interval, the relative spread is measured as the ratio of
the quoted bid-ask spread to the quote midpoint price. This measure is then time-weighted, where
the weighting procedure is based on the number of seconds the quotation exists in each interval.
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All variables analysed in this paper are standardized by subtracting their mean and
dividing by the standard deviation. This procedure allows the analysis to control for crosssectional differences across derivative securities. For each interval, the means of these
standardized variables are then reported for the warrant and option markets. To determine
whether trading variables used in the analysis exhibit distinctive intraday patterns, a number of
analyses of variance tests is performed. F-statistics examine differences in mean trading variables
in one time interval against those in other time intervals across the trading day.
6. RESULTS
Table 1 through 2 reports the cross-sectional mean values for intraday standardized trading
volume, price volatility, order depth and relative spreads for both classes (calls/puts) of warrants
and options, respectively. Figures 1 through 4 plot the intraday distributions for each variable of
interest for warrants and options.
Table 1:
Intraday trading patterns in the equity warrants market
ASX Call warrants
Time
1) 10:00 to 10:15
2) 10:15 to 10:30
3) 10:30 to 10:45
4) 10:45 to 11:00
5) 11:00 to 11:15
6) 11:15 to 11:30
7) 11:30 to 11:45
8) 11:45 to 12:00
9) 12:00 to 12:15
10) 12:15 to 12:30
11) 12:30 to 12:45
12) 12:45 to 13:00
13) 13:00 to 13:15
14) 13:15 to 13:30
15) 13:30 to 13:45
16) 13:45 to 14:00
17) 14:00 to 14:15
18) 14:15 to 14:30
19) 14:30 to 14:45
20) 14:45 to 15:00
21) 15:00 to 15:15
22) 15:15 to 15:30
23) 15:30 to 15:45
24) 15:45 to 16:00

CVOLUME
0.4075
0.2436
0.1168
0.1136
0.0547
0.0411
0.0186
-0.0463
-0.0658
-0.0870
-0.1377
-0.1476
-0.1774
-0.1829
-0.1905
-0.1510

CVOLAT
0.8241
0.2778
0.1425
0.0930
0.0516
0.0071
-0.0135
-0.0608
-0.0926
-0.0899
-0.1586
-0.1646
-0.1831
-0.1956
-0.1933
-0.1717

-0.0816
-0.0344
-0.0034
0.0048
0.0385
0.0447
0.1429
0.4166

-0.0839
-0.0470
-0.0172
-0.0303
0.0008
0.0095
0.0941
0.3136

ASX Put warrants

CDEPTH
0.3053
0.1689
0.1146
0.0895
0.0710
0.0846
0.0210
0.0230
-0.0048
-0.0604
-0.2355
-0.4960
-0.5802
-0.5835
-0.5239
-0.3397

CRSPR
2.0400
0.2822
0.1253
0.0317
-0.0135
-0.0715
-0.0929
-0.1081
-0.1151
-0.1197
-0.0864
-0.1172
-0.1097
-0.1237
-0.1289
-0.1383

PVOLUME
0.3989
0.2186
0.1274
0.1135
0.0198
0.0536
0.0812
-0.0795
-0.0369
-0.1210
-0.0458
-0.1853
-0.1692
-0.1687
-0.1306
-0.0882

0.0453
0.1028
0.1321
0.1266
0.1239
0.1700
0.2262
0.6050

-0.1704
-0.2112
-0.1950
-0.1688
-0.1533
-0.1608
-0.1671
-0.1208

-0.0086
-0.0227
-0.0689
-0.0552
-0.0484
-0.0183
0.0613
0.4477

PVOLAT
0.5292
0.3589
0.1117
0.1140
0.0346
0.0358
0.0269
-0.0967
-0.0419
-0.1416
-0.0652
-0.1693
-0.1570
-0.1779
-0.1715
-0.0957
-0.0272
0.0056
-0.0560
-0.0749
-0.0789
-0.0205
0.0645
0.3459

PDEPTH
0.1516
0.1430
0.1301
0.1178
0.1469
0.0979
0.1314
0.0673
0.0707
0.0063
-0.3671
-0.4254
-0.5217
-0.5317
-0.5023
-0.2883

PRSPR
1.2978
0.3568
0.1449
0.0891
-0.0365
-0.0578
-0.0371
-0.0419
-0.1267
-0.1411
-0.0639
-0.0541
-0.0844
-0.1841
-0.1341
-0.1579

0.0338
0.1384
0.0195
0.0808
0.1502
0.2046
0.0787
0.4362

-0.1222
-0.1847
-0.1171
-0.1132
-0.1016
-0.0557
-0.0660
0.0343

FAll

86.6***

166.6***

309.6***

813.7***

10.8***

15.5***

33.6***

44.7***

Fopen

232.9***

1158.3***

177.0***

8983.9***

29.6***

54.9***

0.2

492.1***

Fclose

282.4***

231.6***

701.5***

10.3***

70.4***

57.2***

52.2***

7.7***

***

***

***

***

166.8***

Fopen/close
Flunch/other

0.1

160.6
***

***

169.6

2909.4

***

***

0.2

3.1
***

*
***

19.8

***

114.8
148.3
1598.9
19.8
11.1
15.7
239.4
1.37
The table shows the mean values of the standardized trading volume, price volatility, order depth and relative spreads of both classes of
warrants (calls/puts) covering ASX stocks for each fifteen minute time interval during the trading day. Trading metrics are
standardized by applying the formulae: ( Xit - µt )/ t, where Xit is the raw variable, µt is the mean for the day and t is the standard
deviation for the day. The trading variables are identified as: CVOLUME = the number of call warrant contracts traded on the ASX;
CVOLAT = the time-weighted standard deviation of call warrant prices using bid-ask midpoints; CDEPTH = total call warrant orders
on either side of the bid-ask schedule; CRSPR = the time-weighted relative spread for the call warrant; PVOLUME = the number of
put warrant contracts traded on the ASX; PVOLAT = the time-weighted standard deviation of put warrant prices using bid-ask
midpoints; PDEPTH = total put warrant orders on either side of the bid-ask schedule; PRSPR = the time-weighted relative spread for
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the put warrant. Our sample consists of actively traded call warrants (215 warrants) and puts (21 warrants) between 1 January 2000
and 30 June 2000. F-statistics report on the significance of intraday differences, where:
- FAll is the F-statistic testing the difference across all 24 time intervals.
- Fopen is the F-statistic testing the difference for interval 1 from intervals 2 to 8.
- Fclose is the F-statistic testing the difference for interval 24 from intervals 19 to 23.
- Fopen/close is the F-statistic testing the difference between interval 1 and interval 24.
- Flunch/other is the F-statistic testing the difference for intervals 11 to 16 from intervals 9 to 10 and intervals 17 to 18.
*** Significant at the 0.001 level.
** Significant at the 0.01 level.
* Significant at the 0.10 level.
Table 2:
Intraday trading patterns in the equity options market
ASXO Call options
Time
1) 10:00 to 10:15
2) 10:15 to 10:30
3) 10:30 to 10:45
4) 10:45 to 11:00
5) 11:00 to 11:15
6) 11:15 to 11:30
7) 11:30 to 11:45
8) 11:45 to 12:00
9) 12:00 to 12:15
10) 12:15 to 12:30

CVOLUME
-0.1975
0.1204
0.1598
0.1716
0.1646
0.1448
0.0843
0.0990
0.0594
-0.0025

CVOLAT
-0.4149
-0.0262
0.0684
0.1438
0.1463
0.1407
0.1288
0.1333
0.0920
0.0770

ASXO Put options

CDEPTH
-0.4628
0.1263
0.3151
0.3903
0.4288
0.4903
0.4746
0.4718
0.4414
0.1837

CRSPR
1.2364
0.6409
0.2552
0.0568
-0.0730
-0.1512
-0.1890
-0.2178
-0.2568
-0.2130

PVOLUME
-0.1339
0.1364
0.2419
0.2422
0.1572
0.1997
0.2458
0.0747
-0.0257
-0.0474

PVOLAT
-0.4011
0.0483
0.2830
0.2778
0.2325
0.2406
0.2195
0.1998
0.1672
0.0556

PDEPTH
-0.5734
0.0050
0.2376
0.3696
0.4034
0.5500
0.5385
0.5343
0.5520
0.1973

PRSPR
1.2795
0.6593
0.2941
0.1112
-0.0804
-0.1621
-0.2379
-0.1964
-0.2299
-0.2090

Lunchtime trading break (12.30 to 14.00 covering intervals 11 to 16)
17) 14:00 to 14:15
18) 14:15 to 14:30
19) 14:30 to 14:45
20) 14:45 to 15:00
21) 15:00 to 15:15
22) 15:15 to 15:30
23) 15:30 to 15:45
24) 15:45 to 16:00
25) 16:00 to 16:15

0.0725
0.0546
0.1002
0.1357
0.1510
0.1529
0.2267
0.3084
0.0397

0.2930
0.2463
0.2813
0.2816
0.3165
0.3554
0.4221
0.6156
0.2341

0.4356
0.4543
0.5065
0.5328
0.5411
0.5655
0.5811
0.3018
-0.1973

FAll

121.5***

469.5***

2023.0***

342.1***

21.2***

84.7***

433.2***

62.1***

***

739.0

***

2694.7

***

2613.8

***

***

***

585.1

***

433.9***

31.5

***

1830.1

***

394.8

***

355.5

***

30.5***

1674.3

***

1475.5

***

331.3

***

406.1***

Fopen
Fclose
Fopen/close

241.5
1.3
368.6

***

-0.0072
-0.2203
-0.2778
-0.3078
-0.3022
-0.3036
-0.3166
-0.2394
0.3276

2049. 9

***

0.0761
0.0133
0.1305
0.1590
0.1360
0.0727
0.1755
0.3824
-0.0314

28.8
0.8
46.6

0.3231
0.2914
0.3237
0.2855
0.2978
0.2986
0.3388
0.6285
0.0431

128.9
0.4

***

206.0

***

0.4992
0.5662
0.5800
0.6354
0.6511
0.6865
0.7209
0.3348
-0.2476

-0.0743
-0.2202
-0.3119
-0.3803
-0.3889
-0.3567
-0.4130
-0.4001
0.1998

The table shows the mean values of the standardized trading volume, price volatility, order depth and relative spreads of both classes of
options (calls/puts) covering ASX stocks for each fifteen minute time interval during the trading day. Trading metrics are standardized
by applying the formulae: ( Xit - µt )/ t, where Xit is the raw variable, µt is the mean for the day and t is the standard deviation for the
day. The trading variables are identified as: CVOLUME = the number of call option contracts traded on the ASXO; CVOLAT = the
time-weighted standard deviation of call option prices using bid-ask midpoints; CDEPTH = total call option orders on either side of the
bid-ask schedule; CRSPR = the time-weighted relative spread for the call option; PVOLUME = the number of put option contracts
traded on the ASXO; PVOLAT = the time-weighted standard deviation of put option prices using bid-ask midpoints; PDEPTH = total
put option orders on either side of the bid-ask schedule; PRSPR = the time-weighted relative spread for the put option. Our sample
consists of actively traded call options (998 options) and puts (222 options) between 1 January 2000 and 30 June 2000. F-statistics
report on the significance of intraday differences, where:
- FAll is the F-statistic testing the difference across all 25 time intervals.
- Fopen is the F-statistic testing the difference for interval 1 from intervals 2 to 8.
- Fclose is the F-statistic testing the difference for intervals 24 to 25 from intervals 19 to 23.
- Fopen/close is the F-statistic testing the difference between interval 1 and interval 25.
*** Significant at the 0.001 level.
** Significant at the 0.01 level.
* Significant at the 0.10 level.

6.1. INTRADAY PATTERNS OF TRADING VOLUME FOR WARRANTS AND
OPTIONS
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6.1.1 EQUITY WARRANTS
Equity warrant trading volume (for both calls and puts) shows a distinct U-shaped pattern across
the trading day. Trading volume at both the open and close of trading are found to be significantly
higher than at other periods in the day. Though higher levels of trading volume are reported at
trading end, it is not found to be significantly different from trading volume at market open.
During lunchtime closure in the option market, a significant drop in equity warrant trading
volume is observed. The intraday trading volume patterns in the equity warrant market suggest
that inelastic demand is higher at the open and close of trading. The higher trading volume at
these points in time can be explained by the trading activities of both hedge and speculative
traders. In a similar argument used by Jain and Joh (1988), we suggest that hedge traders will be
motivated to establish positions at both these points in time to protect their open stock positions
executed across the trading day and to manage those positions which they cannot monitor or
change overnight. By contrast, speculative traders will be motivated to trade near market open, to
take advantage of the arrival of information during overnight closure that has not yet been
incorporated into asset prices.
0.50

Call warrant Volume
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Put warrant Volume
Call option Volume
Put option Volume
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Fig. 1. This figure shows the standardized average trading volume of equity warrants and equity options for each fifteen-minute interval of the
trading day across the sample period 1 January 2000 to 30 June 2000. The standardized variable is computed using the formulae: ( Xit - µt )/ t,
where Xit is the raw variable, µt is the mean for the day and t is the standard deviation for the day.

6.1.2 EQUITY OPTIONS
The intraday trading volume pattern in the equity option market (for both calls and puts) is clearly
distinct from those observed for the equity warrant market. The intraday variation in trading
volume shows an M-shaped pattern (on an upward incline). Trading volume is found to be
relatively low at the open and builds to a peak approximately one hour after market open. This
trend is reversed and continues in that direction up to the close of the morning session. A sporadic
build up of trading volume occurs during the afternoon session, where it reaches its highest level
at the close of the underlying market. A sharp fall in trading volume follows in the next interval.
The market structure of the option market is likely to contribute to an intraday pattern divergent
from those reported above for equity warrants. These differences are explained by the lack of a
call opening procedure in the option market and the presence of market makers. The delay in
open trading volume is attributed directly to the trading procedure employed in the ASXO. In the
equity option market, whilst the trading system opens at 10:00, each class of options remains
suspended until the underlying stock is opened in SEATS. This suggests that market maker
response obligations to provide two-way quotes for their designated stocks starts at least ten
minutes after the official stock open procedure.11 Additionally, market makers may not be
prepared to provide continuous quotes until they can estimate option values more accurately.
Subsequently, option traders may not react based on their expectations of how the underlying
stock responds to new information flow, but rather on actual stock price response. In this
situation, market makers will limit their provision of liquidity services during the first fifteen
minutes of trading, to alleviate the risk exposure they bear due to the greater leverage of the
option. The increase in trading volume after market open is attributed to a reduction in
information asymmetry and higher hedging demand up to the close of the underlying stock
market. The significant fall in option trading volume (for both calls and puts) at the end of trading
is explained by higher information asymmetry, since no inferences can be drawn from underlying
stock price behaviour at this time. The variations in trading volume across the trading day are
consistent with empirical literature from competitive dealer markets in various overseas
exchanges. Stephan and Whaley (1990), Berkman (1992) and Niemeyer (1994) report similar
wave-like intraday patterns in the CBOE, EOE, and the Swedish Options and Forwards Exchange
(OM) respectively.
6.2. INTRADAY PATTERNS OF PRICE VOLATILITY FOR WARRANTS AND
OPTIONS
6.2.1. EQUITY WARRANTS
Price volatility in the warrant market is found to follow a U-shaped pattern, which is significantly
elevated in the first and last fifteen minutes of the trading day. Following the open, price volatility
declines to midday, after which a reversal of this trend occurs fifteen to thirty minutes from the
open of afternoon trading on the option market. While price volatility at the open is significantly
higher than at the close for call warrants, similar results cannot be drawn for put warrants. For
call warrants, this result suggests that at market open, traders have greater divergences of opinion
11

From industry consultation, several market makers have indicated that they start their option trading desks after the end of the opening
procedure for the underlying stocks.

53

The Australasian Accounting Business & Finance Journal, May, 2007
Segara and Segara: Intraday Trading Patterns. Vol. 1, No.2.

expressed by higher price volatility, relative to the close. During lunchtime closure in the options
market, price volatility is found to have a significantly weaker U-shaped pattern. Lower volatility
during this period occurs at a time when information asymmetry and trading volume is at it
lowest. The intraday patterns of price volatility corroborate the positive relations found between
trading volume and price volatility in past empirical work (see French and Roll, 1986 and
Schwert, 1989).12
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Fig. 2. This figure shows the standardized average trading volatility of equity warrants and equity options for each fifteen-minute interval of the
trading day across the sample period 1 January 2000 to 30 June 2000. The standardized variable is computed using the formulae: ( Xit - µt )/ t,
where Xit is the raw variable, µt is the mean for the day and t is the standard deviation for the day.

6.2.2. EQUITY OPTIONS
The intraday price volatility in the equity option market (for both calls and puts) is distinct from
that reported in overseas exchanges.13 Price volatility at the open is at its lowest level compared
to other intervals in the trading day. Following the open, price volatility is observed to increase to
its highest point at the second last interval of afternoon trading. This rise again demonstrates the
link between trading volume and price volatility. A significant drop follows this in the last
interval. It is worthwhile recognising that volatility in the afternoon session is relatively higher
12

13

French and Roll (1986) show that volatility is higher when the market is open than when it is closed, suggesting that trading activity is an
important contributor of short run volatility. Schwert (1989) also finds that growth in trading volume is positively related to an increase in
monthly stock return volatility.
Sheikh and Ronn (1994) and Chan, Chung and Johnson (1995) examine the price volatility behaviour of CBOE options. They find that
variances of call and put returns are found to follow a U-shaped pattern across the trading day.
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than in the morning session. There are three explanations that we posit for intraday volatility
patterns on the ASXO. First, a combination of no orders being allowed prior to opening on the
DTF, and a reluctance of market makers to provide a firm quote and lower trading activity at the
start of trading is most likely to explain the low price volatility levels during the first fifteen
minutes of trading. Second, the increase in volatility in the second last interval of trading is likely
to be as a result of heightened quote requests from hedge traders attempting to adjust their
positions according to their risk tolerances in preparation of overnight closure. Third, lower price
volatility in the option market following the close of the stock market is consistent with the
theoretical model of King and Wadhwani (1990), who predict a drop in price volatility upon the
closure of an associated financial market.
6.3. INTRADAY PATTERNS OF ORDER DEPTH FOR WARRANTS AND OPTIONS
6.3.1. EQUITY WARRANTS
The intraday pattern of order depth across the trading day for equity warrants (for both calls and
puts) displays an almost U-shaped pattern. Order depth is documented to be significantly higher
at both the open and close of trading, with its highest level reached at trading end. During
lunchtime closure, a deep narrow U-shaped pattern is observed.
The intraday pattern in order depth is explained by the market design of the warrant
market. In Section 2, we described that the ASX warrant market is characterized by a hybrid
market, where both limit-order traders and a single market maker (i.e. the warrant issuer)
establish prices. While warrant issuers are not obliged to facilitate a market in their warrants, they
have a material interest in ensuring a liquid and efficient market for their issue. Warrant issuers
have developed a reputation for assuring investors a liquid market place through active
participation in the secondary market.14 We suggest that higher order depths at both the open and
close is consistent with warrant issuers placing a range of limit orders in the bid-ask schedule
during periods of high inelastic transaction demand, in order to ensure a liquid market for their
products. The decline in order depth across midday in the warrant market is explained by the
lunchtime trading break in the options market. During lunchtime closure, the probability of
informed traders participating in the warrant market increases. In turn, we suggest that this
heightens averse selection costs causing a decline in order depth.

14

Market research into the ASX warrant market during 1996 revealed that specific warrant issuers accounted for 42 percent to 57 percent of
turnover for three of the most actively traded warrant series (by open position).
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Fig. 3. This figure shows the standardized average order depth of equity warrants and equity options for each fifteen-minute interval of the
trading day across the sample period 1 January 2000 to 30 June 2000. The standardized variable is computed using the formulae: ( Xit - µt )/ t,
where Xit is the raw variable, µt is the mean for the day and t is the standard deviation for the day.

6.3.2 EQUITY OPTIONS
Order depth in the equity options (for both calls and puts) market exhibits a similar M-shaped
pattern exhibited for trading volume. At the open of trading in the morning session, order depth is
at its lowest level than at any other time of the trading day. Two explanations are posited for this
occurrence. First, as all orders on the DTF are deleted at the end of the trading day, order depth
will be low as limit orders take time to be inputted into the trading system. Second, wider quoted
spreads reported at market open are unlikely to attract new limit orders during this time.
Following the first fifteen minutes of trading, order depth builds up, remains relatively stable and
then declines in the last fifteen minutes before lunchtime closure. At the open of afternoon
trading, order depth is relatively high and stable. A decline in order depth occurs during the
second last interval of trading, where a significant drop at trading end is found. The sharp fall in
order depth before lunchtime closure and at the close of trading is explained by higher
information asymmetry at these times, as market makers will be reluctant to offer liquidity
services because of the risk of trading with an informed investor.
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6.4. INTRADAY PATTERNS OF RELATIVE SPREAD FOR WARRANTS AND
OPTIONS
6.4.1. EQUITY WARRANTS
The intraday pattern of relative spread for equity warrants is observed to follow an almost Lshaped pattern. Relative spreads at the open relative to the close are more pronounced and
significantly higher at both these points in time than at other intervals. Of particular note is that
relative spreads for call warrants are significantly wider during lunchtime closure in the option
market. This result highlights that the closure of one market (i.e. the option market), affects the
pricing dynamics in another related market (i.e. the warrant market). The wider relative spread
patterns reported for equity warrants are explained by higher levels of information asymmetry
present during market open, lunchtime closure and trading end. We suggest that during these
periods, relative spreads are wide because warrant issuers and traders alter the pricing of their
limit orders to avoid being taken advantage of by informed traders.
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Fig. 4. This figure shows the standardized average relative spread of equity warrants and equity options for each fifteen-minute interval of the
trading day across the sample period 1 January 2000 to 30 June 2000. The standardized variable is computed using the formulae: Xit - µt )/ t,
where Xit is the raw variable, µt is the mean for the day and t is the standard deviation for the day.

6.4.2 EQUITY OPTIONS
The intraday pattern of relative spread for equity options is at its widest level immediately after
the open of morning trading. A steady decline then ensues until the last fifteen minutes of the
morning session. This decline is consistent with a reduction in price uncertainty as information
flow is disseminated into the market. After lunchtime closure, a narrowing of spreads is observed.
This trend is reversed, during the last fifteen to thirty minutes in the afternoon session. These
results contradict with those of Chan, et al. (1995a) who do not find an increase in relative
spreads during the last interval of trading in the competitive market dealer setting of the CBOE.
Chan et al. (1995a) attribute these results to the inventory holding cost model. We suggest that the
intraday pattern of relative spreads observed in the ASXO is suited to the ‘learn-by-trading’
theoretical model, which anticipates a loss in price discovery associated with non-trading periods
will result in wider spreads when trading resumes. It is noteworthy that institutional features of
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the options market also explain the observed relative spread variations around lunchtime closure.
Prior to lunchtime, theoretical option prices (indicative prices for at-the-money, in-the-money and
out-of-the-money series for each class) are broadcast at a pre-determined bid-ask spread by the
options exchange. However, this information signal is not broadcast following lunchtime closure
in the options market, indicating a period characterized by market maker price experimentation.
We find that consistent with this institutional feature, relative spreads are observed to be wider
after lunchtime closure and not before.
7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper examines intraday patterns of trading volume, price volatility, order depth and relative
spread for both the equity warrant and equity option markets in Australia. The paper contributes
towards the microstructure literature, where it is the first to document the intraday trading
behaviour for both these derivative securities. We also compare and contrast the intraday patterns
in these securities, which each operate in markets with unique market designs. This allows the
paper to draw inferences into competing market microstructure theories and examine whether
market design differences explain variations in observed intraday patterns. The data used to
analyse intraday patterns is collected from 1 January 2000 to 30 June 2000. Comparison between
the intraday trading patterns of warrants and options is enhanced with the employment of high
frequency databases, which allow for the identification of every order and trade time-stamped to
the nearest one hundredth of a second.
We find that trading volume for equity warrants display a U-shaped pattern, which is
significantly higher at both the open and close of trading. It is suggested that high levels of
inelastic demand exist during these points in time, as investors exchange risk positions before
overnight closure and transfer them back when the market re-opens. At midday (corresponding to
the lunchtime closure in the option market), trading volume for the equity warrant market is
significantly lower. By contrast, equity options exhibit an M-shaped intraday pattern in trading
volume, where it is observed to be at its lowest at market open, increase to its highest point at the
close of the underlying market and sharply fall at the end of trading. These patterns are attributed
to the market design specific to the option market, in particular to the existence of official market
makers. Price volatility in the warrant and option markets are found to be similar to that observed
for trading volume. These results support existing literature, which find evidence of positive
relations between trading volume and price volatility (e.g., French and Roll, 1986 and Schwert,
1989). Intraday variations in order depth for warrants and options are found to be distinct from
one another. For equity warrants, order depth displays a U-shaped pattern across the trading day.
By contrast, order depth on the equity option market follows an M-shaped pattern, similar to that
observed for trading volume. Divergences in order depth intraday patterns between the warrant
and option market are explained by differences in risk tolerances of market-maker(s) and the
differences in trading protocols and mechanisms used across both these markets. Relative spreads
are reported to be wide at the open and close of trading for both the warrant and option markets.
Wider relative spreads at the open and close are explained by theories relating to information
asymmetry and price experimentation. While the market power model cannot be ignored for the
relative spread behaviour in equity warrants, the inventory holding cost argument is not
applicable in either market. Overall, we conclude that specific market design features together
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with information asymmetry models are important forces on the trading behaviour in the markets,
as reflected by their intraday trading patterns.
Our paper finds some clear evidence that trading behaviour in one market affects the
trading behaviour in another related market. During lunchtime closure in the option market, wider
relative spreads are found in the warrant market, indicative of a loss in price discovery. A similar
result is found in the option market following the close of trading in the stock market. A clear
area of future research is to examine the price discovery linkage between equity warrants and
equity options. A step in this direction will provide a better understanding of the price discovery
process and possible arbitrage opportunities existing between these markets.
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